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In Outsourced Database model, data owners publish their data management requests
through a number of remote, un-trusted external service providers. Service providers
host owners’ databases and offer seamless mechanisms to create, store, update and access
(query) their databases. This model introduces several research issues related to data
security. In this thesis, we introduce a mechanism for users to verify that their query
answers on a multi-dimensional dataset are correct, in the sense of being complete and
authentic. Two instantiations of the approach are studied:(1) Verifiable KD-tree (VKD-
tree) that is based on space partitioning, and (2)Verifiable R-tree (VR-tree) that is based
on data partitioning. The schemes are evaluated on window queries, and results show
that VR-tree is highly precise, meaning that few data points outside of a query result
are disclosed in the course of proving its correctness. Moreover, as an extension of
the VR-tree, we proposed a mechanism that extend the signature-based mechanism for
users to verify that their answers for k nearest neighbors queries on a multidimensional
dataset are complete (i.e. no qualifying data points are omitted), authentic (i.e. no answer
points are tampered) and minimal (i.e., no non-answer points are returned in the plain).
Essentially, our scheme returns k answer points in the plain, and a set of (~p; q)-pairs
of points, where ~p is the digest of a non-answer point p in the dataset to facilitate the
signature chaining mechanism to verify the authenticity of the answer points, and q is a
reference point (not in the dataset) used to verify that p is indeed further away from the
viii
query point than the kth nearest point. We study two instantiations of the approach - one
based on the native data space using space partitioning method (a.k.a. R-tree) and the
other based on the metric space using iDistance. We conducted an experimental study,
and report our findings here.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Continued growths of the Internet and advances in networking technology have fuelled a
trend toward outsourcing data management and information technology needs to external
Application Service Providers. By outsourcing, organizations could operate their core
task and other business applications via the Internet, while the involved maintenance of
database could be operated in house (without connected to the Internet).
Database outsourcing [15] is an important manifestation of this trend. In this model,
data owners engage third-party data servers (called publishers or service providers) to
manage their data and process queries on their behalf [15, 23], and publishers are re-
sponsible for offering adequate software, hardware and network resources to host data
owner’s databases as well as mechanisms for the client to efficiently create, update and
access the outsourced data.
This model is applicable to a wide range of computing platforms, including database
caching [20], content delivery network [40], edge computing [21], P2P database [18],
etc.
Comparing to the conventional client-server architecture where the owner also under-
takes the processing of user queries, the Outsourced Database Model reduces Network
1
2Latency by pushing application logic and data processing from the owner’s data cen-
ter out to multiple publisher servers situated near user clusters. Rather than fortifying
the owners’s data and provisioning more network bandwidth for every user, by adding
publisher servers, scalability is much easier to be achieved. Moreover, the separation of
business and maintaining tasks avoids the single point of failure in the data’s own center,
hence reducing the database’s susceptibility to denial of service attacks and improves
service availability.
The database outsourcing by Third-party Publisher poses numerous research chal-
lenges which influence the overall performance, usability and scalability. One of the
foremost challenges is the security of stored data - it is essential to provide adequate
security service measures to protect the stored data from both malicious outside attack-
ers and the publisher itself. Security in this sense includes maintaining data integrity
and guarding data privacy, moreover, how query processing can be efficiently performed
over the secured data is closely relevant.
1.1 Motivation
High-value information, such as geophysical(or cartographic) data, pharmacological in-
formation, and business data, which are used in high-value decisions, are frequently
made available for online-querying. Customers dependent upon highly reliable and effi-
cient access to accurate information need assurance that their queries will be answered
promptly, reliably, and accurately; incorrect information may lead to substantial losses.
Simple digital signature scheme and trusted-third party data publishing model are not
suitable to solve this problem, both of them suffer from several problems.
With digital signature, the owner of the data operates an online database server, which
processes queries and signs the results using a resident private signing key skowner. Users
3can verify the authenticity of the answers using the corresponding public key,pkowner.
Although this approach could provide both integrity and non-repudiation of the answers,
it is impractical due to system vulnerability problem, as well as the expensive signing key
protection mechanism. Moreover, the approach is generally too expensive to implement
in the application domain.
A more scalable approach is to use a trusted third-party publishers of the data, in
conjunction with a key management mechanism which allows certification of the signing
keys of the publisher to speak for the author of the data. However, this approach also
suffers from the problem and expense of maintaining a secure system accessible from
the internet. Furthermore, to get a client to trust him to provide really valuable data, the
publisher would have to adopt careful and stringent administrative policies, which might
be more expensive for him (and thus also for the client).
In this work, we focus on query authentication and processing in an untrusted third-
party data publishing model(in this thesis, we would only address the untrusted third-
party data publishing model as Outsourced Database Model, and we will use these two
terms exchangeably), especially concerned with data that is updated infrequently and
queried much more often, such as financial histories, pharmacological data, cartography
etc.
There are three main entities in the Outsourced Database Model: the data owner,
the database service provider(publisher) and the client. Figure 1.1 depicts the model, in
general, many instances of each entity may exist.
 The data owner maintains a master database, and distributes it with one or more
associated signatures that prove the authenticity of the database. Any data that has
a matching signature is accepted by the user to be trustworthy.











Figure 1.1: Data Publishing Model
There could be several publisher servers that are situated at the edge of the net-
work, near the user applications. The publisher is not required to be trusted, so the
query results that it generates must be accompanied by some “correctness proof”,
derived from the database and signatures issued by the owner.
Moreover, as it is difficult for an attacker to successfully compromise multiple
independent servers without being detected, security can be improved substantially
when those servers are independent of each other in different part of the building
or even belong to different data center.
 The user issues queries to the publisher explicitly, or else gets redirected to the
publisher, e.g. by the owner or a directory service. To verify the signatures in the
query results, the user obtains the public key of the owner through an authenticated
channel, such as a public key certificate issued by a certificate authority.
There are several security considerations in the data publishing model. Query au-
thentication is important for a client as it is necessary to ensure the results provided by
the untrusted third party publisher is both inclusive and complete. Since the publishers
are outside of the administrative domain of the data owner, and in fact may reside on
poorly secured platforms, the query results that they generate cannot be accepted at face
value, especially when they are used as basis for critical decisions.
5Several existing works provide for checking the authenticity [25, 30] and complete-
ness [15, 29] of query results. However, most of them only deal with one-dimensional
datasets. Devanbu’s scheme[15] handles multiple key attributes by essentially concate-
nating them in some preferred order key1jkey2j:::jkeyn; this scheme is expected to be
very inefficient for symmetric queries, such as window and nearest neighbor queries,
that are typical in multi-dimensional context.
In this work, our primary concern is the threat that a dishonest publisher may return
incorrect query results to the users, whether intentionally or under the influence of an ad-
versary. An adversary who is cognizant of the data organization in the publisher server
may make logical alterations to the data, thus inducing incorrect query results. In addi-
tion, a compromised publisher server can be made to return incomplete query results by
withholding data intentionally. Therefore mechanisms for users to verify the complete-
ness as well as authenticity of their query results are essential for data publishing model.
Moreover, it is highly desirable that only answers are returned in the plain to facilitate
access control.
There are also other concerns that are not focused in our work. Given that the pub-
lisher servers are not trusted, one concern is Privacy of the data. Obviously, an adversary
who gains access to the operating system or hardware of a publisher server may be able
to browse through the database, or make illegal copies of the data. Solutions to miti-
gate this concern include encryption (e.g. [3, 2, 4]) and steganography (e.g. [7, 32, 1]).
Another concern relates to user access control, in specifying what actions each user is
permitted to perform. Those issues have also been studied extensively (e.g. [13],[32],
[26], [39]), and are orthogonal to our work here.
61.2 Contributions
In this work, we first propose a mechanism for users to verify that their window query
results on a multi-dimensional dataset are authentic (i.e. no answer points are tampered)
and complete (i.e. no qualifying data points are omitted). In addition, our approach
guarantees minimality (i.e. no non-answer points are returned in the plain).
Our approach, which is described in chapter 3, builds authentication information
into a spatial data structure, by constructing certified chains on the points within each
partition, as well as on all the partitions in the data space. We introduce two schemes
based on this approach. The first, the Verifiable KD-tree (VKDtree), is based on the
space partitioning k-d tree. The second, the Verifiable R-tree (VRtree), employs data
partitioning and is based on the R-tree. The schemes are evaluated on window queries,
and results show that VRtree is highly precise, meaning that few data points outside of
a query result are disclosed in the course of proving its correctness. Moreover, both
schemes are computationally secure, and incur low processing and update overheads. To
the best of our knowledge, the authentication mechanism introduced in this thesis is the
first that enables a user to verify the completeness of a multi-dimensional query result
generated by an untrusted server.
However, the mechanism above can only deal with hyper-rectangle window queries.
While this scheme can be used for kNN queries, it will return more points in the plain
than the answer points and thus is vulnerable to access control violation.
As an extention of the VR-tree mechanism, in chapter 4, we present the authentica-
tion scheme for kNN queries. Moreover, we further show that the entire framework can
be nicely put together to support range, window, and RNN queries. While the extension
to range and window queries is straightforward, that for RNN queries is non-trivial.
Like existing works [11, 29], our authentication mechanism for kNN query is based
on the signature chain concept, and verifies that the k NN answers are complete (i.e. no
7qualifying data points are omitted), authentic (i.e. no answer points are tampered) and
minimal (i.e. no non-answer points are returned in the plain). The core of the scheme
is to return k answer points in the plain, and a set of (~p; q)-pairs of points, where ~p
is the digest of a non-answer point p in the dataset to facilitate the signature chaining
mechanism to verify the authenticity of the answer points, and q is a reference point (not
in the dataset) used to verify that p is indeed further away from the query point than the
kth nearest point. The scheme is minimal since only the k answer points are revealed.
We study two instantiations of the approach - one based on the native data space using
space partitioning method (a.k.a. R-tree) and the other based on the metric space using
iDistance. We have implemented both techniques, and our results show that the R-tree-
based scheme has better performance when the number of dimensions is low (d < 8),
while iDistance-based scheme is superior in high-dimensional datasets (d > 8). To our
knowledge, this is the first reported work that addresses this problem.
We have implemented the proposed VR-tree and verification scheme, and conducted
experiments on kNN queries. Our results show that we can verify kNN queries with low
overheads.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the thesis proposal is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we discuss some
backgrounds such as cryptographic primitives and related work. Next,we present our
work on windows query authentication in data publishing model in chapter 3. Chap-
ter 4 presents the authentication scheme for kNN queries. Finally, chapter 5 gives the
conclusion and proposes some directions to pursue in the future work.
Chapter 2
Backgrounds
Before we present our solutions, in this chapter, we first describe some cryptographic
primitives that our proposed solution based on, next we discuss some related works.
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Our proposed solution and many of the related work are based on the following crypto-
graphic primitives:
One-way hash function: A one-way hash function, denoted as h(:), is a hash function
that works in one direction: it is easy to compute a fixed-length digest h(m) from a
variable-length pre-image m; however, it is hard to find a pre-image that hashes to a
given hash value. Examples include MD5 [33] and SHA [6]. We will use the terms hash,
hash value and digest interchangeably.
Digital signature: A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for authenti-
cating the integrity and origin of a signed message. In the algorithm, the signer uses a
private key to generate digital signatures on messages, while a corresponding public key
is used by anyone to verify the signatures. RSA [34] and DSA [5] are two commonly-
8
9used signature algorithms.
Signature aggregation: As introduced in [10], this is a multi-signer scheme that aggre-
gates signatures generated by distinct signers on different messages into one signature.
Signing a message m involves computing the message hash h(m) and then the signa-
ture on the hash value. To aggregate t signatures, one simply multiplies the individual
signatures, so the aggregated signature has the same size as each individual signature.
Verification of an aggregated signature involves computing the product of all message
hashes and then matching with the aggregated signature.
Signature chain: In [29], a signature chain scheme is proposed that enables clients
to verify the completeness of answers of range queries. A very nice property of the
scheme is that only result values are returned, thus ensuring that there is no violation
of access control. The scheme is based on two concepts: (a) The signature of a record
is derived from its own digest as well as its left and right neighbors’. In this way, an
attempt to drop any value from the answer of a range query will be detected since it
would no longer be possible to derive the correct signature for the record that depends
on the dropped value. (b) For the boundaries of the answer, a collaborative scheme that
involves both the publisher and the client is proposed – the publisher performs partial
computation based on but not revealing the two records bounding the answer and the
query range, while the client completes the computation based on the two end points of
the query range.
2.2 Related Work
Previous work on query authentication can be categorized to approaches that based on
Merkle Hash Tree and approaches that based on Signature Chains.
Approaches [15, 14] utilize the Merkle Hash Tree to provide authentication. The
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owner builds a Merkle Hash Tree on the tuples in the database, based on the query
attribute. Subsequently, the server answers the selection query by returning all tuples t
covering the result as well as the minimum set of hashes necessary for the client to recon-
struct the subtree of the Merkle Hash Tree corresponding to the query result.The scheme
works for range queries, but not multi-point queries that pull back several segments of
tuples.
The work by Roos et al [35] also employs the MHT to authenticate range queries.
However, the focus is on encoding the VO in a compact form to minimize communica-
tion overhead; their scheme has the same limitations as [15].
In [16], Devanbu et. al. proposed a scheme that handles multiple key attributes by
essentially concatenating them in some preferred order key1jkey2j:::jkeyn. However,
this scheme is expected to be very inefficient for symmetric queries, such as window and
nearest neighbor queries, which are typical in multi-dimensional context.
The MB-tree concept proposed by Li et al. [19] combines concepts from the B+-tree
and the MH-tree. The structure stores the actual records together with their digests into
the leaves and associated each node a digest that computed on the concatenation of its
children’s digests. The data owner signs the root digest and send to the publisher along
with the data. Range query results computed by the publisher are returned together with
the two boundary records, digests of siblings along the path from the root to the boundary
points are also returned. Upon receiving the results and VO, the client reconstructs the
root digest and matches it against the signature. Unfortunately, the above schemes are
applicable only for single dimensional data.
SearchDAG [22] transforms a wide class data structures into generalized authentica-
tion data structure. Authentication over peer-to-peer storage networks are proposed in
[36]. Pang et al. [30]proposed the VB-tree structure, which is basically a B+-tree that
incorporates hierarchically organized signed digest. This might be the first disk-resident
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authenticity data structure introduced; however, this structure doesn’t ensure query com-
pleteness.
There are also approaches based on signature chains [29], a signature chain scheme
is proposed that enables users to verify the completeness of answers of range queries. A
very nice property of the scheme is that only result values are returned, thus ensuring that
there is no violation of access control. The scheme is based on two concepts: (a) The
signature of a record is derived from its own digest as well as its left and right neighbors’.
In this way, an attempt to drop any value from the answer of a range query will be
detected since it would no longer be possible to derive the correct signature for the record
that depends on the dropped value. (b) For the boundaries of the answer, a collaborative
scheme that involves both the publisher and the user is proposed – the publisher performs
partial computation based on but not revealing the two records bounding the answer and
the query range, while the user completes the computation based on the two end points
of the query range.
Most of the above approaches only deal with one-dimensional datasets, and cannot
handle queries over multiple attributes. Recently, an efficient authentication scheme for
multi-attribute range aggregate queries was proposed in [31]. A multi-dimensional struc-
ture is used that maintains partial sums (or aggregates) at internal nodes of the structure.
However, this work only deals with traditional relational aggregates such as count, sum
and average, and is not designed for the more complex query types that we consider in
this paper.
We note that there are other security issues that the data outsourcing model poses
such as privacy, user authentication and access control. These have been studied exten-
sively (e.g. [3], [32], [26], [39]), and are orthogonal to our work here.
Chapter 3
Authenticating Window Query Results
in Data Publishing
In this chapter, we study the problem of authenticating window query results in data
publishing. Section 2.1 describes the system and threat model by introducing a running
example. Our authentication schemes are discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, while Sec-
tion 2.4 presents results from a performance study. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the
chapter.
3.1 System and Threat Model
Figure 1.1 in chapter One depicts the data publishing model, where we had described the
three distinct roles of this model.
Our primary concern addressed in this work is the threat that a dishonest publisher
may return incorrect query results to the users, whether intentionally or under the in-
fluence of an adversary. An adversary who is cognizant of the data organization in the
publisher server may make logical alterations to the data, thus inducing incorrect query
results. Even if the data organization is hidden, for example through data encryption
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or steganographic schemes (e.g., [32]), the adversary may still sabotage the database
by overwriting physical pages within the storage volume. In addition, a compromised
publisher server could be made to return incomplete query results by withholding data
intentionally. Therefore mechanisms for users to verify the completeness as well as au-
thenticity of their query results are essential for the data publishing model.
In this work, we assume a d-dimensional data space. Let L = (L1; L2; : : : ; Ld) and
U = (U1; U2; : : : ; Ud) be two points that bound the entire d-dimensional data space,
where Lr  Ur for all r. L and U are known to all users. Suppose the space contains N
data points given by DB = fp1; p2; : : : ; pNg. We also denote pi = (xi1; xi2; : : : ; xid).
We would like design an authentication scheme for users to verify answers to the
following queries:
 Window query. Let pl = (xl1; xl2; : : : ; xld) and pu = (xu1; xu2; : : : ; xud) be two
points in the data space. A window query Qw = [pl; pu] returns all points within
the hyper-rectangle determined by the two bounding points in QW In other words,
a point pi = (xi1; xi2; : : : ; xid) is in the answer if xlj  xij  xuj for 1  j  d.
 Range query. Let pc = (xc1; xc2; : : : ; xcd). A range query Qr = [pc; r] returns all
points bounded by the hyper-sphere centered at pc with radius r. In other words, a
point pi = (xi1; xi2; : : : ; xid) is in the answer if dist(pc; pi)  r, where dist(x; y)
is a function that computes the Euclidean distance between two points x and y.
 kNN query. Let pc = (xc1; xc2; : : : ; xcd). A kNN query Qk = [pc; k] returns k
points A = fq1; q2; : : : ; qkg such that
8qi 2 A; 8pj 2 DB  A; dist(pc; qi) < dist(pc; pj)
 RNN query. Let pc = (xc1; xc2; : : : ; xcd). An RNN query RNN(pc) returns all
14
points that have pc as their nearest neighbors, i.e.,
RNN(pc) = fp 2 DBj8pj 2 DB   fpg; dist(p; pc) < dist(p; pj)g
In this chapter, we discuss the authentication of window queries in a multi-dimensional
dataset. The discussion of authenticating other query types are deferred to chapter 4.
A Running Example:
Consider a dataset containing 20 data points in two-dimensional space as shown in
Figure 3.1. The figure also includes a window query Q, for which fr13; r14g is the
correct result. A rogue publisher may return a wrong result fr13; r14; r100g, which
includes a spurious point r100, or fr13; r14g in which some attribute values of r13
have been tampered with. To detect such incorrect values, the user should be able to

























[ id, x-coord, y-coord, user-name, account#, … ]
Data:
Figure 3.1: Running Example
A different threat is that the publisher may omit some result points, for example by
returning only fr13g for queryQ. This threat relates to the completeness of query result.
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3.2 Signature Chain in Multi-Dimensional Space
The goal of our work in this chapter is to devise a solution for checking the correctness
of query answers on multi-dimensional datasets. The design objectives include:
 Completeness: The user can verify that all the data points that satisfy a window
query are included in the answer.
 Authenticity: The user can check that all the values in a query answer originated
from the data owner. They have not been tampered with, nor have spurious data
points been introduced.
 Precision: Proving the correctness of a query answer entails minimal disclosure of
data points that lie beyond the query window. We define precision as the ratio of
the number of data points within the query window, to the number of data points
returned to the user.
 Security: It is computationally infeasible for the publisher to cheat by generating
a valid proof for an incorrect query answer.
 Efficiency: The procedure for the publisher to generate the proof for a query an-
swer has polynomial complexity. Likewise the procedure for the user to check the
proof has polynomial complexity.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the data in the multi-dimensional space
are split into partitions – this can be done using a spatial data structure. To ensure that
the answer for a window query is complete, two issues must be addressed. First, we need
to prove that the answer covers all the partitions that overlap the query window. We refer
to these partitions as candidate partitions. Second, we need to prove that all qualifying
values within each candidate partition are returned. The first issue is dependent on the
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partitioning strategy adopted, and is deferred to Section 3.3. In the rest of this section,
we shall focus on the second issue.
Assuming we have proven that the query answer covers all the candidate partitions,
we now need to ensure that all the qualifying values in those partitions have not been
dropped. Consider a candidate partition P for the window query Q = [(ql1; ql2; : : : ; qld),
(qu1; qu2; : : : ; qud)]. There are three possible cases: (a) Q contains P . Since the window
query bounds the partition, we need to ensure that all the points in P are returned. (b) P
contains Q. The query window is within the space covered by the partition. A naive
solution is to return all the points in P . A better solution, which we advocate, is to return
only those points that are necessary for users to check for completeness. In both cases,
our concern is to ensure the secrecy of points that are outside Q. (c) P overlaps Q. This
case can be handled by splitting P into two parts: the part of P that contains Q, and the
part of P that does not overlapQ. The former is handled in case (b), while nothing needs
to be done for the latter. Thus, we shall focus on cases (a) and (b), and not discuss case
(c) any further.
Our solution extends the signature chain concept in [29] to multi-dimensional space.
This is done by ordering the points within the partition, and then constructing the sig-
nature chain. In this chapter, we adopt a simple scheme of ordering the points based
on increasing (x1; x2; : : : ; xd) value. In 2-d space, (x1; y1) is ordered before (x2; y2) if
x1 < x2, or x1 = x2 and y1 < y2. Based on this ordering, we need to return all the points
whose first dimension is within the range [ql1; qu1], as well as the bounding points. Of
course, some of these points may fall beyond the query window along the second dimen-
sion. For such points that should not be part of the answer, we return only their digests
rather than the actual values, in order to protect their secrecy and achieve high precision.
We choose this simple ordering scheme over more sophisticated space filling curves
[37] because: (a) A partition (corresponding to a 4K or 8K block/page) typically consists
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of a small number of points (100-200). Moreover, the actual number of points within a
partition would be smaller than the maximum capacity (since the page is typically not
full). As such, it may not be worthwhile to employ a complicated scheme. (b) None
of the existing space filling curves perform well in all cases. Thus, they really offer
no significant advantage over the simple scheme (especially given the small number of
points).
For the example in figure 3.1, assuming that the entire space corresponds to one
partition, the points would be ordered from r1 to r20. For case (a) where the query
bounds the partition, r1 to r20 would be returned; for case (b) where the query (i.e., the
box that bounds r13 and r14) is within the partition, we return the values of r13 and r14
and the digest of the various dimensions for r11, r12, r15, r16 and r17. We now present
the details of our solution that extends the signature chain scheme to multi-dimensional
setting.
Construction: Let L = (L1; L2; : : : ; Ld) and U = (U1; U2; : : : ; Ud) be two points that
bound the entire data space, where Lr  Ur for all r. L and U are known to all users.
Consider a partition P bounded by two points p0 = (x01; x02; : : : ; x0d) and pk+1 =
(x(k+1);1; x(k+1);2; : : : ; x(k+1);d)where x0r  x(k+1);r for all r. Suppose P contains k data
points p1 = (x11; x12; : : : ; x1d), : : : pk = (xk1; xk2; : : : ; xkd). Without loss of generality,
we assume that pi is ordered before pj for 1  i < j  k. Clearly, p0 is ordered before
p1 and pk+1 is ordered after pk.
Our multi-dimensional signature chain constructs for each point within P an associ-
ated signature (based on [29]):
sig(pi) = s(h(g(pi 1)jg(pi)jg(pi+1))) (3.1)
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where s is a signature function using the owner’s private key, h is a one-way hash func-





where hj(xir) = hj 1(h(xir)) and h0(xir) applies a one-way hash function on x.1
Moreover, for the two delimiters,
sig(p0) = s(h(h(L1j : : : jLd)jg(p0)jg(p1))) (3.3)
sig(pk+1) = s(h(g(pk)jg(pk+1)jh(U1j : : : jUd))) (3.4)
In addition, each partition P has an associated signature:
sig(P ) = s(h(g(p0)jg(pk+1)jh(k))) (3.5)
Query Processing: Assuming that a partition P is returned. We have to prove that all
the data points within P that fall within the query window Q are returned.
Case (a): Q contains P . The verification process for this case is straightforward. The
publisher server returns p0 to pk+1, and k, together with the respective signatures sig(p0)
to sig(pk+1) and sig(P ). (To reduce traffic overhead, we could send just one combined
signature instead of the individual signatures, using the signature aggregation technique
in [10].) The user first verifies that
s 1(sig(P )) = h(g(p0)jg(pk+1)jh(k))
Then, for each pi, 1  i  k, the user verifies that pi is indeed in P (by checking that
P bounds pi). Finally, for each pi, 1  i  k, the user computes its digest and checks
whether
s 1(sig(pi)) = h(g(pi 1)jg(pi)jg(pi+1))
1To achieve tighter security, h0(xir) can be redefined as h0(xirjrand(pi))where rand(pi) is a random
number associated with pi; in which case we will need to supply the corresponding rand(pi) with each
returned record. For ease of presentation, we shall adopt the simpler definition of h0(xir).
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If all the above checks are successful, the answer contains all the data points in P .
Case (b): P contains Q. Let pi = (xi1; xi2; : : : ; xid). The data points in P can be
separated into: (a) p; p+1; : : : ; p 1; p such that xi1 2 [ql1; qu1] for   i  . These
points can be further categorized into answer points (A) and false positives (F). For
each answer point pi 2 A, 8r xir 2 [qlr; qur], whereas for each false positive pi 2 F ,
9r xir =2 [qlr; qur]. (b) p1; : : : ; p 1; p+1; : : : ; pk, which are clearly not answer points.
(i) For each point pi 2 A, the server returns pi and sig(pi).
(ii) For each point pi 2 F [ fp 1; p+1g, the server returns several pieces of in-
formation: (i) if xir 2 [qlr; qur], hUr xir 1(xir)jhxir Lr 1(xir) is returned; (ii) if
xir < qlr, hqur xir 1(xir) and hxir Lr 1(xir) are returned; (iii) if xir > qur,
hUr xir 1(xir) and hxir qlr 1(xir) are returned.
(iii) The server also returns p0, pk+1, k, sig(p0), sig(pk+1) and sig(P ).
With information from step (ii), the user can compute g(pi) without knowing the
actual value of pi:
 If xir < qlr, the user applies h on (hqur xir 1(xir)) (Ur qur) times to get (hUr xir 1(xir)).
 If xir > qur, the user applies h on (hxir qlr 1(xir)) (qlr Lr) times to get (hxir Lr 1(xir)).
 The user computes g(pi) using Equation (3.2).
The above procedure is secure against cheating by the publisher provided hi(p) for i < 0
is either undefined or computationally infeasible to derive. We use an iterative hash
function for hi(p), because there is no known algebraic function that satisfies the re-
quirement. To ensure that h 1(p) 6= p, a hash function is chosen that outputs a different
digest length from the length of p.
Similar to case (a), the user verifies the completeness of the query answer as follows:
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 Verify that the bounding box is correct using information from step (iii), and de-
termine whether s 1(sig(P )) = h(g(p0)jg(pk+1)jh(k)).
 Verify that each point p in A is in P by checking that p is bounded by P .
 Verify that each point pi 2 A is authentic using information in step (ii) and the
derived information to check s 1(sig(pi)) = h(g(pi 1)jg(pi)jg(pi+1)).
Again, any attempt by the publisher server to cheat would lead to an unsuccessful match
in at least one of the above cases.
Finally, we emphasize that extra data points that are returned for proving complete-
ness are in the form of digests. Thus only the existence of the data points are revealed,
but not their actual content. If a non-answer pi 2 F has the same coordinate as an
answer point pj 2 A along some dimension, both points will have the same digest for
that dimension and pi’s coordinate will be revealed. This can be overcome by simply
adopting h0(xirjrand(pi)) as explained previously.
3.3 Verifying the Data Partitions
Having shown how to prove that all qualifying data points in a candidate partition (that
overlaps the query window) are returned correctly, we now look at the first issue of
verifying that the query answer covers all the candidate partitions.
A naive solution is to treat the entire data space as a single large partition, so that the
mechanism described in Section 3.2 alone suffices. However, we expect this solution to
have poor precision.
To achieve high precision, we adopt partition-based strategies so that only those par-
titions that contain some qualifying data points need to be considered for a query. In
this way, any potential information leakage is limited to only those partitions that con-




















































Figure 3.2: Partitioning Strategies
solution based on two partitioning techniques (see Figure 3.2): space partitioning and
data partitioning.
3.3.1 Space Partitioning
With space partitioning schemes, the partitions are disjoint but their union covers the
entire data space. As such, all we need to do is to verify that the bounding boxes of
the returned partitions are correct, and that the union of these partitions covers the query
scope. The former has already been addressed in Section 3.2, while the latter is just a
simple check on the partition boundaries.
To illustrate, Figure 3.2(a) shows the data space being partitioned through a k-d tree
[9]. In the figure, the window of the query Q overlaps three partitions, so only data from
these three partitions are returned in the answer.
Besides the k-d tree, other spatial indexing techniques like the grid file [27] and
quadtree [38] can also be employed to help the publisher to locate the candidate partitions
quickly. Our authentication mechanism entails no changes to the spatial data structures.































Figure 3.3: Chaining of Partitions.
3.3.2 Data Partitioning
With data partitioning approach (e.g., R-tree), the union of all the partitions may not
cover the entire data space. Thus, space that contains no data points may not be cov-
ered by any partition, as illustrated in Figure 3.2(b). The existence of empty space poses
a challenge to verifying the completeness of query answers: How does the user know
that portions of a query window that are not covered by any returned partitions indeed
are empty spaces, without physically examining all the partitions? Referring to Fig-
ure 3.2(b), how can the user be sure that Q only intersects boxes B4 and B6 and not the
other partitions?
Our solution is to extend the signature chain concept to the partitions. Specifically,
we order the partitions by their starting boundaries along a selected dimension (as is done
for point data), then chain the partitions so that the signature of a partition is dependent
on the neighboring partitions to its left and right.
Let the bounding box of the ith partition be demarcated by [l; u]where l = (li1; li2; : : : ; lid),
23
and u = (ui1; ui2; : : : ; uid). Each partition Pi has an associated signature (based on sig-
nature chaining):
sig(Pi) = s(h(g(Pi 1)jg(Pi)jg(Pi+1))) (3.6)
where Pi 1 and Pi+1 are the left and right sibling partitions of Pi, and g(Pi) is defined as
follows:
g(Pi) = h(h(li1j : : : jlid)jh(ui1j : : : juid)jh(ki)) (3.7)
where ki is the number of points within Pi.
In addition, we define two fictitious partitions as delimiters. This is similar to what
we did in building the signature chain for data points in Section 3.2, so we shall not
elaborate further.
During query processing, all the partition information along with their signatures
are returned as part of the query answer. The user can be certain that no partition is
omitted, otherwise some signatures will not match. For those partitions that overlap the
query window, the user then proceeds to check their data points using the mechanism in
Section 3.2. The remaining partitions that do not intersect the query window are dropped
from further consideration.
To minimize the extra partitions that are disclosed to the user, and to reduce perfor-
mance overheads, we apply a hierarchical data partitioning indexing structure like the
R-tree on the data. The partitions within each internal node of the R-tree are chained
as described above. Given a window query, the publisher server iteratively expands the
child nodes corresponding to those candidate partitions in the current node, starting from
the root down to the leaf nodes. All the partition information and signatures along the
path of traversal are added to the query answer for user verification.
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Figure 3.4: The Verification R-tree.
3.4 A Performance Study
In this section, we report results of an experimental study conducted to evaluate the
effectiveness of our authentication mechanisms, which we have implemented in Java.
We study three schemes: Verifiable KDtree (VKDtree) scheme that is based on space
partitioning using the k-d tree; Verifiable Rtree (VRtree) scheme that is based on data
partitioning using the R-tree; and Z-ordering scheme which employs Z-ordering [28] on
the entire data space (as a single partition). The performance metric is the precision of
query answers. Again, a low precision reveals the existence of extra data points and
incurs traffic overhead, but not the actual content of those data points.
Unless stated otherwise, the following default parameter settings are used: the num-
ber of dimensions is 4, the data distribution is Gaussian, the number of data points is
1; 000; 000. The domain of each dimension is [1, 10M]. The node capacity is 50 (i.e.,
each node holds up to 50 data points). Queries are generated by picking a point ran-
domly from the dataset, then marking out the query window with the chosen point as
center. The length of the query window along each dimension is l  domain size; by
default, l is set to 0:1. For each experiment, we run 500 queries, and take the average
precision.
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3.4.1 Effect of Number of Dimensions
We first vary the number of dimensions from 2 to 5. The results are summarized in
Figure 3.5(a). As expected, as the number of dimensions increases, all the schemes lose
precision, because more non-answer points must be provided to verify the completeness
of the query answers.
We also observe that the VKDtree scheme performs well for two-dimensional space,
but its precision drops dramatically at higher dimensions. This is because more partitions
are returned as a result of their overlapping the query window. The result for Z-ordering
is, surprisingly, similar to the VKDtree scheme. In fact, it even performs better than
VKDtree in some cases. Investigation shows that this is because the coverage of the par-
titions returned under VKDtree may be larger than the region covered by the Z-ordering
scheme. Finally, the VRtree scheme achieves precisions of at least 60%, is least affected
by dimensionality, and appears to perform the best overall. This is because the data par-
titioning scheme is able to effectively limit the number of candidate partitions returned
in the query answers.
3.4.2 Effect of Different Data Distributions
In the second experiment, we study the effect of different data distributions. Figure 3.5(b)
shows the precisions of the various schemes under three different distributions: Expo-
nential, Uniform and Gaussian. The precisions of all the schemes are better with the
exponential dataset, because the data generated under the exponential distribution are
clustered toward one corner (the origin) of the data space, whereas they are more spread
out under the other two distributions.
The relative performance of the three schemes remain largely the same as before:
with VRtree performing the best, while VKDtree and Z-ordering exhibit similar perfor-


































































































Figure 3.5: Comparative Study
under uniform data distribution.
3.4.3 Effect of Dataset Sizes
With a fixed data space, the size of the dataset will have an effect on the performance of
the schemes. In particular, for large datasets, the data space becomes more densely pop-
ulated. For a fixed-size query, this means that the precision will, with high probability,
be higher (compared to one with small dataset size). This intuition is confirmed in our
study, as shown in Figure 3.5(c) which presents the results for dataset sizes of 1,000,000,
100,000, and 10,000. The relative performance of the various schemes remain largely
the same as in the earlier experiments, though VRtree is less affected by the size of the
datasets compared to VKDtree and Z-ordering.
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3.4.4 Effect of Node Capacity
In this study, we examine the effect of node capacity, which determines the maximum
number of points allowed per partition. Obviously, a larger node capacity means that
it is more likely that more non-answer points are returned (compared to a smaller node
capacity), thus yielding lower precisions. Figure 3.5(d) shows the results for node ca-
pacities of 30, 50 and 80. From the figure, we notice that the precision of all the schemes
improve as the node capacity reduces from 80 to 50 and then to 30.






























Figure 3.6: Client Computation Cost
In this section, we evaluate the overhead of computation cost at the client side in
authenticating the query results. For both VKDtree and VRtree, the client computation
cost includes result entry verification cost (CRV ), boundary verification cost(CBV ) and
signature verification cost (CSV ). Figure 3.6 shows the authentication overhead of VKD-
tree and VR-tree conducted in our experiment, where the overhead is measured as
client computation cost   processing cost
processing cost
where the processing cost refers to the cost for verifying only answer tuples. It turns out
that there is no significant differences between the two schemes - while VRtree incurs
lower cost to verify the answers (lower false drops), it incurs additional cost to verify the
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chaining of partitions; whereas VKDtree does not need to deal with partition chaining
but it returns more false drops and hence incur larger cost to verify the answers.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a mechanism for users to verify that their windows query
answers on a multi-dimensional dataset are correct. The mechanism follows a partition-
based strategy, and comprises two steps: (a) verify that all partitions relevant to the
query are returned, and (b) verify that all qualifying data points within each relevant
partition are returned. The signature chain technique from [29] is used to chain up points
and partitions so that any malicious omissions can be detected by the user. We study
two schemes: Verifiable KD-tree (VKDtree) that is based on space partitioning, and
Verifiable R-tree (VRtree) that is based on data partitioning. The schemes are evaluated
on window queries, and results show that the VRtree is highly precise, meaning that
few data points outside of a query answer are disclosed in the course of proving its
correctness.
Chapter 4
Authenticating KNN Query Results
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem definition of authenticating kNN Query
results in section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes the method of hiding non-answer points
to enforce minimality of Verification Objects. Section 4.3 presents an overview of the
query verification scheme. In section 4.4 and 4.5, we present how to handle kNN
queries under the native and metric space respectively. Section 4.6 shows results from a
performance study. Finally, section 4.7 concludes this chapter.
4.1 Problem Definition
The general setting of our KNN Query authentication problem is as follows. A data
owner of a multi-dimensional dataset DB outsourced the management of DB to a third-
party publisher. Besides DB, (s)he also created one or several associated signatures of
DB that are outsourced together with it. Users are also made aware of certain meta-
data, as well as the public key of the owner. During query processing, the publisher
returns the answers and the associated verification objects (VOs) for the users to verify
the correctness of the answers.




































Figure 4.1: Sample Queries on a 2-dimensional Dataset (A Running Example).
r20, in a 2-dimensional space. Figure 4.1 shows a window queryQw for which fr13; r14g
is the correct result. A rogue publisher may return a wrong result fr13; r14; r100g, which
includes a spurious point r100, or fr13 ; r14g in which some attribute values of r13 have
been tampered with. To detect such incorrect values, the user should be able to verify the
authenticity of the query result. A different threat is that the publisher may omit some
result points, for example by returning only fr13g for query Q. This threat relates to the
completeness of query result.
Similarly, the figure also shows a range query [pc; r] whose correct answers are
fr5; r8; r9g. Here, an adversary may choose to return fr5; r9g (i.e., an incomplete an-
swer). As another example, the figure also illustrates a 3NN query (i.e., k = 3) centered
at pc. The correct answers for this 3NN query are fr5; r8; r9g. Now, a compromised
publisher may return fr4; r8; r9g (i.e., an incorrect answer). Likewise, the RNN of r14 is
fr13; r15g, and an adversary may simply return fr13g (i.e., an incomplete answer).
As shown in the above examples, there is a need to design mechanisms for users to
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verify the authenticity and completeness of their query answers. In addition, we aim to
design mechanisms that return only the answer points in the plain (and no other data
points will be returned in the plain). We refer to this as the minimality property. The
minimality property is highly desirable as it facilitates confidentiality without violating
access control. So, referring to our example, our proposed mechanism will return exactly
the answers - fr13; r14g for the window query, fr5; r8; r9g for the range and 3NN queries,
and fr13; r15g for RNN(r14) - as well as additional verification objects which will not
contain any data points in the plain.
4.2 Enforcing Minimality: Hiding Non-answer Points
In the last chapter, we have examined how points can be signature-chained together. We
have shown how the authenticated structure can ensure authenticity and completeness.
Authenticity is realized through the signature computation scheme. Completeness is
realized by returning a chain of points that contains a superset of the answer points and
verifying that they are correct - this is because dropping any point along the chain can
be easily detected as it would not lead to correct signatures for the point’s neighbors.
Before we look at the proposed query verification schemes, let us examine how we can
enforce minimality so that all non-answer points that are needed in query verification
are not returned in the plain. We note that we cannot simply return the digests of
non-answer points because we do not have a guarantee that the digests correspond
to non-answer points. Referring to our running example in Figure 4.1, for the range
query [pc; r], suppose the adversary returns only r5 and r9 in the plain together with the
digests for r3, r4, r6, r7, r8 and r10. Clearly, we can determine that the chain is correct.
However, we cannot be sure that any of these non-answer points are truly non-answer
points. In fact, in this example, the adversary has dropped r8. Thus, we need a scheme
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that allows us to hide non-answer points while guaranteeing that they are indeed outside
of the query region.
Our solution is to associate with each non-answer point p a reference point q deter-
mined by the publisher which is typically not a data point (unless it so happen that the
data point is also in the answer set). With q, the publisher returns (~p; q)-pairs to the user
instead of p, where ~p is a partial computation of the digest of p. The user can then de-
termine the digest of p from ~p and q. Moreover, with q, the user can determine that p is
outside of the query region. We will discuss this process in the rest of this section.
4.2.1 Collaborative Digest Computation
In our authentication scheme, the signature of a point is dependent on the one-way hash
function g (i.e., Equation 3.2) used to compute the digest of a point. We note that g
is an iterative hash function that can facilitate the user and publisher to collaboratively
determine the digest of a point p. The basic idea is that given a reference point q known
to both the user and the publisher, the publisher can partially compute the digest of
p wrt q and then the user completes the computation wrt q. To illustrate, let a point
p = fx1; x2; :::; xdg and another point q = fy1; y2; :::; ydg, such that xi < yi 8i. Then,
instead of returning the digest of p directly, the server can compute hyi xi 1(xi) and
hxi Li 1(xi). The user will then derive g(p) using Equation 3.2 after applying h on
(hyi xi 1(xi)) an additional of (Ui   yi) times to get (hUi xi 1(xi)) 8i. Now, similar
computation can be derived for different relations between xi and yi. Thus, we can
determine the digest of p collaboratively without revealing p.
4.2.2 Hiding Non-Answer Points
The combination of signature chain and collaborative computation turns out to provide
a very powerful mechanism to hide non-answer points while guaranteeing that they are
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indeed not in the query regions.
We illustrate this important concept using three examples. In Figure 4.2(a), we have
a window query. Here, along a signature chain of 5 points (p1 to p5), only p2 and p4
are answer points. Let each point pi be represented as (xi1, xi2). Now, let X(l1; l2) and
Y (u1; u2) be the two bounding points of the window query. Let L(L1; L2) and U(U1; U2)
be the lower and upper bounding points of the entire data space. Note that the user needs
the digest of p1 and p3 in order to verify that p2 is authentic. On one hand, we do not
want to return p1 in the plain since that may violate confidentiality. On the other hand, we
cannot simply return the digest of p1. Our collaborative scheme described above hides
p1 by using X as a reference point. Instead of returning p1 in the plain, the publisher
computes hl1 x11 1(x11), hx11 L1 1(x11) and (hU2 x12 1(x12)jhx12 L2 1(x12)). The user
will then derive g(p) using Equation 3.2 after applying h on hl1 x11 1(x11) an additional
of (U1   l1) times to get hU1 x11 1(x11). Now, X is an appropriate reference point as
we actually use its x-dimension value to assure us that p1 is outside/to-the-left of the
query window (i.e,. x11 < l1). Similarly, we can hide p3 and p5 using Y as the reference
point. From the example, we can also see that reference points for window queries are
essentially the bounding points of the query.
In Figure 4.2(b), we see how non-answer points can be hidden from a range query
(centered at q with radius r). Here, we can use the bounding hyper-cube of the range
query to hide points p1 and p5 (as described above using the hyper-cube as a window).
However, for point p4, the publisher introduces and returns a reference pointX(x1; x2) in
addition to hU1 x41 1(x41), hx41 x1 1(x41) and hx2 x42 1(x42), hx42 L2 1(x42). The user
will then derive g(p) using Equation 3.2 after applying h on hx41 x1 1(x41) an additional
of (x1 L1) times to get hx41 L1 1(x41), and applying h on hx2 x42 1(x42) an additional
of (U2   x2) times to get hU2 x42 1(x42). More importantly, with X , we know that p4
is outside of the range query region: from the computation of the digest, we know that
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x41 > x1 and x2 > x42 (but we do not know the actual values), otherwise the digest will
not be defined; therefore, as long as r  dist(X; q), we know that p4 is outside of the
query range. In a similar way, reference point Y can be used to hide p1 (though we have
chosen to use the hyper-cube bounding point).
Finally, in Figure 4.2(c), the data space is split into 6 equal regions. A constrained
range query centered at q and radius r is one that is restricted to one region (e.g., the
region bounded by the two lines BL and BR). As we shall see later, such a query is
useful when we process RNN queries. For a constrained range query, certain points can
be hidden in a similar way as we handle window queries (e.g., p1, p5 and p8) and range
queries (e.g., p2). For points like p3 and p7 it becomes more challenging. However, the
same concept of reference points can be used. In our example, for p3, we can pick a
reference pointX on the line BL. We note that the user needs to verify that the reference
point is on the line BL. (Alternatively, the reference point can be outside of the line BL.
In this case, to verify that the point is a valid point that is outside of the line BL, the
user can compute the angle between the line formed by q and X , and the horizontal
line passing through q, and compare this against that of the angle formed by BL and the
horizontal line passing through q.) Now, we can use the collaborative approach for the
user to compute the digest of p3. Using the same logic, a reference point Y can be used
to facilitate the collaborative computation of the digest of p7 without returning p7 in the
plain.
Thus, as we can see, non-answer points can be hidden!
4.3 Query Answer Verification
In this section, we present an overview of the query verification scheme. First, we give






































Figure 4.2: Authentication Overhead on different Dataset Size
cating window, range and RNN queries.
4.3.1 The Basic Solution
Our proposed solution, in its most basic form, ensures authenticity, completeness, and
minimality, and works as follows. WLOG, let us consider a kNN query [pc; k] (see
Figure 4.1). Once the publisher computes the k answers, it returns only the k answers in
plaintext. In addition, it also returns the following verification objects:
 It returns the k signatures of the answer points. These are used to verify that the
data have not been tampered with.
 The k points returned may not fall into a consecutive sequence along the signature
chain. For example, in Figure 4.1, there is a gap between r5 and r8 (i.e., there are
points between r5 and r8 which are not answer points). Thus, the publisher will
also need to return the partial computation of the digests of a number of points
that form a chain. Referring to our example again, we need to return the partial
digests of points r3, r4, r6, r7 and r10. We will defer the discussion on how these
points are determined to the later sections. It suffices at this moment to note that
we must return r3 to be certain that there is no point within the hyper-sphere that
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is chained between r3 and r4. The user will then derive the digests of these points
to verify the authenticity of the answer points. For example, by computing the
digests of r4 and r6, we can verify if r5 is authentic. Similarly, with the digest of
r7, we can verify if r8 is authentic. Similarly, the digest of r10 is needed to verify
the authenticity of r9.
 Now, for the user to verify that the answers are indeed the k answer points, he/she
need to show that all other points in the chain are outside of the hyper-sphere cen-
tered at Pc with radius r. We note that the r = dist(Pc; kth answer point). Using
our example, the user need to verify that r3, r4, r6, r7 and r10 are outside of the
hyper-sphere. To do this, the publisher also returns a set of reference points. Let
the number of non-answer points returned be M . Then, the number of reference
points needed is (at most) M , one for each of the non-answer points. These ref-
erence points are points in the space but not from the dataset. Moreover, they are
points on or outside of the hyper-sphere surface so that the distance between these
points and Pc is larger than or equal to r, but shorter than the distance between
their corresponding non-answer points and Pc. Note that the publisher can easily
determine these points since it knows all the points in the dataset. Using our run-
ning example again, r3 has a reference point X , r4 has a reference point Z, and r6
and r7 have the same reference point W . For each (non-answer point, reference
point) pair, the partial digest of the non-answer point is computed by the pub-
lisher (as described earlier), and the user can complete the computation and derive
the actual digest of the non-answer point. As long as the digest is valid, the user
will know that the non-answer point is outside of the hyper-sphere (since it knows
that the distance between Pc and the reference point is larger than the radius of the
hyper-sphere). We will discuss how the reference points are selected in subsequent
sections (since not any arbitrary reference point works). In addition, we note that
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we can optimize the number of reference points returned since it is possible that a
number of non-answer points can use the same reference point. Referring to our
example, one reference pointW can be used for both points r6 and r7.
Taking our running example again, the query answer for this 3NN query Q is fr5; r8; r9g.
Besides the plaintext for these+ 3 answers, the publisher also returns the following veri-
fication objects:
 Signatures of the 3 answer points, which are sig(r5), sig(r8) and sig(r9).
 For the two boundary points r3 and r10 of the answer’s signature chain returned,
the publisher returns two pairs ( ~r3; B1) and ( ~r10; B2), where ~r3 and ~r10 are the
partial computation of the digests of r3 and r10 respectively. Points B1 and B2
are the leftmost and rightmost point of the hyper-sphere query respectively, where
B1:x = Pc:x  dist(Pc; r9) and B2:x = Pc:x+ dist(Pc; r9).
 For points r4; r6; and r7 that fall into the gap of the answer points along the con-
secutive signature chain sequence, the publisher returns pairs ( ~r4; Z), ( ~r6;W ), and
( ~r7;W ) respectively, where ~ri is the partial digest of point ri, Z and W are the
corresponding reference points selected for each ri.
Clearly, the proposed method is minimal since only the k answer points are returned
in the plain!
4.3.2 Generalizing to Other Query Types
The above scheme can be easily generalized to handle window and range queries. We
also describe how it can authenticate the more complicated reverse NN queries.
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Window Query
For window query [pl, pu], all objects outside of the window can use either one of these
two bounding points as a reference point (recall the discussion in Section 4.2). For
example, consider the window query (hyper-cube centered at Pc) in Figure 4.1. Now, r3,
r6, r7, and r10 are not part of the answer points that need to be returned. For r3, we can
see that the x1 value of pl would suggest r3 is outside of the window. Similarly, the x2
value of pu would suggest that r6, r7 and r10 are outside the window. Thus, for window
queries, as we have described in chapter 3. the query’s bounding points themselves
provide the reference points. Which means there is no need for the publisher to provide
any reference points.
Range Query
A range query [Pc; r] can be easily handled in the same way as a kNN query - it needs to
verify that the answer points are in the hyper-sphere centered at Pc with radius r, and that
all points outside of the hyper-sphere are indeed outside (as is done in the verification
for kNN query).
Reverse NN Queries
In [17], a two phase algorithm is proposed to retrieve the RNN of a query point q in a
2-dimensional data space. In the first phase, the data space around the query point q is
divided into six equal regions S1 to S6. For each region Si (1  i  6), a constrained
NN query is processed to retrieve the nearest neighbors of q in that region. Let the point
for Si be pi. It turns out that these six points constitute the candidate result set. In other
words, either pi 2 RNN(q) or (ii) there is no RNN of q in Si. Thus, in the second
phase, a NN query is applied to find the NN of each candidate pi. We denote the NN of
pi as p0i. If dist(pi; q) < dist(pi; p
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the two-phase RNN algorithm in [17].
a false hit and discarded.
As an example, consider Figure 4.3 which divides the 2-dimensional space around a
query point q into six equal regions S1 to S6. In Figure 4.3, the NN of q in S1 is point
p2. However, the NN of p2 is p1. Consequently, there is no RNN of q in S1 and we do
not need to search further in this region. The same is true for S2 (no data points), S3, S4
(p4; p5 are NNs of each other) and S6 (the NN of p3 is p1). There is only one answer for
RNN(q) which is p6 in region S5.
Now, since both phases of the above scheme consists of a series of NN queries, we
can adapt our kNN authentication scheme here. The authentication scheme comprises
two cases: (a) The point pi in region Si is indeed the RNN of q; and (b) The point pi in
region Si is not the RNN of q. Case (b) is much more challenging because we need to
hide pi as well as its NN in order to show that its NN is not q. We present our solution








Figure 4.4: Authentication of RNN point (Case (a))
Case (a): pi in region Si is the RNN of q
When the publisher returns pi in region Si as the answer (in the plain), the user need to
do the following to verify that it is indeed an answer (we also describe the verification
objects that the publisher need to return):
 Verify that pi is the NN of q. To do this, the publisher returns the results of the
constrained range query with q as the center and r = dist(pi; q) as the radius. A
constrained range query refers to the query being bounded by the splitting plane
of the region (as discussed in Section 4.2). We note that the results consist of pi,
the partial digests of points that are along the signature chain, and the associated
reference points. As shown in Section 4.2, we can then verify if pi is indeed the
only point, and if so, it is the NN of q. Otherwise, we know that the publisher has
cheated.
 Verify that q is the NN of pi. To do this, the publisher returns the results of a range
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query centered at pi with radius r (together with the associated signature chain,
and reference points). Clearly, as long as there is no answer point for this query (q
is a query point), we know that q is the NN of pi. We can thus conclude that pi is
a RNN of q.
Figure 4.4 illustrates an example. Here, region S5 has two points p6 and p7. Since p6 is
the answer, it will be returned in the plain. The first constrained range query centered at
q with radius r = dist(q; p6) would allow us to know that p6 is indeed the NN of q. The
second range query centered at p6 with radius r would confirm that no points are within
this query region, and hence p6 is the correct answer. From the figure, it is clear that p7
is further away to p6 than q.
Case (b): pi in region Si is not the RNN of q
In this case, since pi is not an RNN of q, we cannot return pi in the plain. However, we
need to (1) verify that pi is an NN of q, and (2) verify that there exists another point t
such that dist(pi; t) < dist(pi; q). Note that these have to be done without revealing pi
and t.
Our approach works as follows:
 We note that to verify that a point (without revealing it in the plain) is in a query
region, we need two reference points. For example, consider Figure 4.2(a), to
verify that p2 is in the window query, we basically need to say that p2 is on the
right of and above X as well as on the left of and below Y . Clearly, with only
one of X or Y , we would not be able to guarantee that p2 is in the window query.
Thus, the publisher returns two reference points X and Y such that: (a) rl =
dist(q;X) < ru = dist(q; Y ), (b) pi is the only answer of a constrained range
query centered at q with radius ru, (c) there are no answer points of a constrained












Figure 4.5: Authentication of RNN point (Case (b))
he/she can easily verify that no points are in the constrained range query [q; rl]
and only pi is in [q; ru].
 Verify that dist(pi; t) < rl. To do this, the publisher need to also return a reference
point v such that a range query centered at v with radius, R, contains pi and t. We
note that R  dist(pi; t)=2. As long as dist(pi; t) < 2R < rl, we are done. Thus,
the publisher need to choose 4 additional reference points - 2 to verify that pi is in
the range query, and 2 to verify that t is in the range query. With the four reference
points, the publisher is able to determine R.
Figure 4.5 illustrates an example. Here, the restricted region has one point p4 which
is the NN of q. However, p4’s NN is p6. We first find reference points and rl and ru that
allow us to verify the boundaries of p4. Similary, we can find reference points to allow
us to find the boundaries that encloses p6 and p4. As shown, in this figure, 2R < rl < r
and hence we can determine that p4 is not an RNN(q) without revealing p4 and p6.
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4.4 kNN Authentication in Native Space
In this section, we present our solution for authenticating kNN queries in the native
space. With the VR-tree, the verification process involves two steps: a) we need to
verify that none of the valid partitions have been missed; b) for partitions that should be
checked, none of the valid points have been missed.
Verifying that the query answer covers all the candidate partitions is straightforward
for a known hyper-sphere. It comprises the following two phases:
 In the first phase, we need to identify the list of candidate partitions. A partition is
a candidate if the range of the ordering dimension of its MBR overlaps the range
of the ordering dimension of the tightest hyper-cube that bounds the hyper-sphere.
In our example, only partitions R1, R2 and R3 are candidate partitions.
 In the second phase, some of these candidate partitions can be further pruned. The
ones to be pruned are those whose minimum distance to Pc is larger than the hyper-
sphere radius r (since no points inside these partitions will ever be nearer than the
kth NN answer point. This can be easily verified since the bounding points of each
partition are known. In our example, R1 and R3 are further pruned.
For each remaining candidate partition P , there are 3 possible relationships between
P and the hyper-sphere (denoted H(Pc; r)) centered at Pc with radius r.
1. H(Pc; r) contains P . In this case, we return all the points in P , i.e., the pub-
lisher returns p0 to pn+1 and n, together with the respective signatures sig(P0) to
sig(Pn+1) and sig(P ). The user would compute the digests for both the points and
the partition to verify the result.
2. P contains H(Pc; r). Let Pi = (xi1; xi2; :::; xid), and Pc = (o1; o2; :::; od). Let
H 0(Pc; r) be the most tightly bounded hyper-cube of H(Pc; r), thus H 0(Pc; r) is
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also centered at point Pc, and the length of each edge l = 2r. Let H 0(Pc; r)’s
bounding points be (hl1; hl2; :::; hld) and (hu1; hu2; :::; hud). Thus, hui = oi+ r and
hli = oi   r for all i 2 [1; d]. The data points in P can be separated into
(a) p; p+1; :::; p 1; p , such that xi1 2 [hl1; hu1] for   i  .
These points can be further categorized into answer points (A) and false
positives (F). For each answer point pi 2 A, dist(Pc; Pi)  r, and for
each false positive pi 2 F , dist(Pc; Pi) > r. Furthermore, there are two
types of false positive points. In the first type, denoted Fa, for each pi 2
Fa, 9z; xiz =2 [hlz; huz]. In the second type, denoted Fb, for each pi 2 Fb,
8z; xiz 2 [hlz; huz]. Note that Fa corresponds to points outside the hyper-
cube, while Fb are points inside the hyper-cube but outside the hyper-sphere.
Let us use the data space in Figure 4.1 as an example of a partition containing
the hyper-sphere. Here, we have A = fr5; r8; r9g, Fa = fr6; r7g and Fb =
fr4g.
(b) p1; :::p 1; p+1; :::pk, which are clearly not answer points. Referring to Fig-
ure 4.1, these points are r1 to r3 and r10 to r20.
For data points from different categories, the publisher returns different sets of
verification objects.
(a) For each point pi 2 A, the publisher returns pi and sig(pi).
(b) The publisher also returns p0, pn+1, sig(p0) and sig(pn+1), and sig(P ).
(c) For each point pi 2 Fa [ Fb [ fp 1; p+1g, the publisher finds a reference
point S = (S1; S2; :::; Sd) on the surface of the hyper-sphere1, such that, if
xiz < oz, Sz 2 (xiz; oz), else if xiz > oz, Sz 2 (oz; xiz).
1We do not require the point to be on the surface. All that is needed is to find a point that is outside
of the hypersphere that is closer to the query point than the point to be hidden. However, for ease of
presentation, we shall refer to the reference point as a point on the surface.
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We note that the same S point could be used as a reference point for multiple
pis as long as the above conditions hold. For simplicity, we pick the point
closest to the sphere’s surface on the line joining Pc and pi. Among these
points, we then eliminate “redundant” reference points.
After an S point is chosen for each pi 2 Fb, we could simply verify that
dist(Pc; pi) > dist(Pc; S)  r.
The publisher then returns several pieces of information together with the
detailed information of point S:
i. if xiz < Sz, hSz xiz 1(xiz) and hxiz Lz 1(xiz) are returned.
ii. if xiz > Sz, hUz xiz 1(xiz) and hxiz Sz 1(xiz) are returned.
With the above information, the user can compute g(pi) without knowing the ac-
tual value of pi.
 if xiz < Sz, the user applies h on hSz xiz 1(xiz) an additional (Uz   Sz)
times to get hUz xiz 1(xiz).
 if xiz > Sz, the user applies h on hxiz Sz 1(xiz) an additional (Sz   Lz)
times to get hxiz Lz 1(xiz).
 The user computes g(pi) using Equation 3.2.
Consider Figure 4.1 again as our example where P contains H(Pc; r). We could
see that the point r7 is outside the hyper-cube, which means that r7 is not an answer.
Instead of just returning the value of r7, the publisher picks a reference point W
near the circle, whereW:x > r7:x andW:y < r7:y. Then (part of the information)
the server returns: for query answers fr8; r9g, it returns r8, r9, sig(r8), and sig(r9);
for r7, it returns (1) hW:x r7:x 1(r7:x) and hr7:x L:x 1(r7:x);(2) hU:y r7:y 1(r7:y)
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and hr7:y W:y 1(r7:y). Here, L and U denote the two bounding points of the par-
tition. With these, the user can determine hU:x r7:x 1(r7:x) and hr7:y L:y 1(r7:y),
and compute the digest of r7. (S)he can then further verify that r8 is an answer
point.
3. P overlaps H(Pc; r). This case can be handled by splitting P into two parts: one
overlaps H 0(Pc; r) (the hyper-cube of H(Pc; r)), and the other does not overlap
H 0(Pc; r) (which means it does not overlapH(Pc; r)). For the first part, we handle
it in the same manner as case (2) above. For the second part, it can be dropped
(except to verify that its points are outside H 0(Pc; r)). As such, we shall not go
into the details of this case.
In the above discussion, we have assumed only one layer of partitioning. We can
easily extend the scheme to work with the VR-tree. All that is needed is to verify that
no internal nodes are tampered with and dropped unnecessarily. This can be done as
described above since the internal nodes are also signature chained.
4.5 kNNAuthentication inMetric Space: iDistance Based
Scheme
In Section 4.4, we have looked at how to authenticate kNN queries in the native data
space. In this section, we shall look at the problem when points are stored in the metric
space. Many data structures have been designed for processing kNN queries in metric
space. We shall discuss the method that is based on the iDistance [41] scheme here.
iDistance is an efficient technique for kNN search that can be adapted to different data
distributions. In iDistance, the data space is partitioned according to a set of reference










Figure 4.6: iDistance based scheme
high-dimensional points are transformed into points in a single dimensional space and
indexed by a classical B+-tree. In particular, points in a partition are mapped into a range
of values in the single dimensional space such that no two partitions have overlapping
ranges. Thus, all points in partition Pi is located to the left side of points in partition
Pi+1 in the B+-tree.2
Within the same partition, data points are ordered by their distance from the data
point to its reference point. Referring to Figure 4.6, we have 3 partitions formed by 3
reference points R1, R2 and R3 respectively. A range query with center at q and radius
r will need to access data points in the shaded region shown in the figure.
In iDistance data structure, data partitioning is independent of the spatial location of
the data points but only related to the selection of reference points. Moreover, the shape
of partitions in iDistance structure is a hyper-sphere that is centered at its reference point
Oj with radius rPj = max(dist(ri; Oj)). Let a hyper-sphere query be centered atQ with
radius rq. Partition Pj does not overlap with the query and can be pruned from further
consideration if the following holds:
dist(Q;Oj)  rPj + rq (4.1)
2We note that the original iDistance scheme did not discuss how partitions are ordered. Here, we adopt
a simple strategy that orders the partition based on the values of the first dimension of the reference point.
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On the other hand, if dist(Q;Oj) < rPj+rq, we have to return the detailed information to
show that all the query results contained in this partition are returned correctly. Now, as
reported in [41], the set of points that need to be examined are bounded by the following
inequality
dist(Q;Oj)  rq  dist(Oj; ri)  dis(Q;Qj) + rq (4.2)
In the authentication model, we build up the signature chain directly on top of the B+-
tree. Let Oj = (Oj1; Oj2; : : : ; Ojd) be the reference point for partition Pj . The signature
of each data point ri is
sig(ri) = s(g(ri 1)jg(ri)jg(ri+1)) (4.3)
where g(ri) = h(h(ri)jh(dist(ri; Oj)). Moreover, for each partition Pj ,
sig(Pj) = s(h(Oj)jh(max(dist(ri; Oj)))jh(k)) (4.4)
where h(Oj) = h(h(Oj1)jh(Oj2)j : : : jh(Ojd)) and k is the number of data points con-
tained in partition Pj .
Similar to the R-tree based scheme, authentication of kNN queries for the iDistance
based scheme contains the following two steps:(a) Verify that no overlapped partitions
is missing; (b) Verify that no result points inside the overlapped partition is tampered or
dropped.
To verify that all overlapped partitions are returned, the publisher need to return the
following information to the client:
 For each partition Pj , return Oj , rPj , k and sig(Pj). With these information, the
client can verify that the partition information has not been tampered with. More-
over, the client can safely prune away partitions that satisfy Equation 4.1 from
further verification.
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Here, we assume that the client knows the number of partitions; otherwise, additional
information has to be provided (e.g., the signature for the total number of partitions, and
the number of partitions). We note that this phase can be optimized by chaining the
partitions to minimize the amount of information to be sent to the client. This is similar
to the process of verifying partitions in the R-tree based scheme.
Now, for each partition Pj that overlaps the query hyper-sphere, we need to verify
that no points has been tampered or dropped. The publisher returns the following infor-
mation to facilitate verification:
 The continuous sequence of signature chain within Pj that satisfy Equation 4.2.
Since the signatures are ordered by the distance to the reference point, those points
matching the inequality would form a continuous signature chain and should be
returned to the user as verification objects. Since not all points with the same
distance are answer points, this chain of points contain both answer points A and
false positives F . For each point pi 2 A, the publisher returns pi and sig(pi). For
each point pj 2 F , the publisher returns a reference point S = (S1; S2; : : : ; Sd) on
the hyper-sphere (in the native space) as well as the corresponding (partial) digest.
As in the R-tree based scheme, different false positive points could share a same
reference point S as long as the following condition holds: if riz < Qz; Sz 2
(riz; Oz); else Sz 2 (Oz; riz); 1  z  d.
 The publisher also returns the (partial) digests of the two points bounding the con-
tinuous sequence of signature chain above. Essentially, these two points allow the
client to verify that no other points within the partition has been dropped. Each of
these points is also associated with a reference point.
We note that the verification process is done in the native space. Once the client
receives all the verification objects, it operates in the native space in the same manner
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as that described in the R-tree based scheme. In other words, with the k answer points,
it can determine the hyper-sphere query and hyper-cube query. For each of the non-
answer points, the client uses its associated reference point to verify that it lies outside
the hyper-sphere.
4.6 Performance Study
We have implemented the proposed solution for verifying kNN queries and conducted
a series of experiments to study their performance. For our VR-tree, we implemented
the R*-tree data structure [8]. In [12], we also presented a metric-based scheme us-
ing the B+-tree based iDistance structure [41]. The codes for both mechanisms are
implemented in C++. The performance metrics used in our study is the authentication
overhead introduced and the I/O access cost. The authentication overhead is computed
as the number of overhead points=k, where the number of overhead points refer to the
number of non-answer points returned.
Unless stated otherwise, we use the following default parameter settings. The number
of dimensions is 4. The data distribution is Gaussian, the number of data points is 100K,
the domain of each dimension is [0, 1M]. The node capacity is 30 (i.e., each node holds
up to 30 data points). Queries are generated by randomly picking a point from the
database, and the value of k for the kNN query is 10. For each experiment, we vary one
of the above parameters, run 200 queries, and take the average score.
4.6.1 Effect of Number of Dimensions
We first vary the number of dimensions from 2 to 32. Figure 4.7 summarizes the result.
As expected, a higher dimensionality introduces more overhead for both mechanisms



































Figure 4.7: Authentication Overhead on Different Data Dimension
Moreover, as the number of dimensions increases, the data space “expands” correspond-
ingly; with a fixed dataset size, the data points for higher dimensional dataset are spread
more sparsely. Thus, given kNN queries with the same k value, the radius of the corre-
sponding hyper-sphere in a higher dimensional dataset is much larger than its radius in a
lower dimensional dataset.
Another observation is that for small number of dimensions, the R*-tree based mech-
anism yields lower authentication overhead. However, the iDistance based mechanism
is superior when the number of dimensions is higher. This is reasonable as R*-tree has
its own structural restriction when the dimensionality is high.
4.6.2 Effect of Different Dataset Size
In our second experiment, we study the effect of different dataset size for a fixed data
space. Figure 4.8 shows the authentication overhead of the two schemes under different
dataset size.
From the result, we observe that as the dataset size increases, the authentication





































































Figure 4.8: Authentication Overhead on different Dataset Size
mechanism, the overhead decreases initially. Our investigation suggests the following
reasons - the increasing dataset size reduces the size of the kNN query, which actually
reduces the radius of its corresponding hyper-sphere. The R*-tree based method is more
sensitive to this kind of reduction because of the overlaps in the MBR of its internal
nodes in the structure. However, as the dataset size increases further, given the fixed data
space, the space becomes too dense, resulting in larger overhead.
4.6.3 Effect of Different Data Distributions
In this experiment, we study the effect of different data distributions. As shown in figure
4.9, the results are measured under three different distribution: Exponential, Uniform and
Gaussian. We note that both methods incur lesser overheads with the exponential dataset.
This is because the data generated under the exponential distribution are clustered toward
one corner (the origin) of the data space, whereas they are more spread out under the
other two distributions. Moreover, the relative performance of the two methods remains
the same for different data distributions. This result is also consistent with the findings



































































Figure 4.9: Authentication Overhead on different Data Distribution
4.6.4 I/O Access Cost
Figure 4.10 shows the I/O access cost for the two mechanisms at the server. We see that
the R*-tree based method outperforms the iDistance based method when the number of
dimensions is small, while it incurs more I/O cost when the number of dimensions is
large. This is consistent with previous works since the R*-tree method degenerates in
























Figure 4.10: I/O Access Cost
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a solution for users to verify their answers when
they query a multi-dimensional dataset. In particular, our scheme supports a wide range
of query types, namely window, range, kNN and RNN queries. Our solution extends
the signature chain scheme for multi-dimensional dataset. In this way, we can achieve
authenticity and completeness. Moreover, our scheme introduces a positional reference
point P for each non-answer point examined. This enables the scheme to achieve the
minimality property. We have implemented the scheme for kNN queries. Our experi-
mental study showed that the proposed method is effective and incurs low overhead.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In data outsourcing model, data owners engage third-party data servers (called publish-
ers) to manage their data and process queries on their behalf. As these publishers may
be untrusted or susceptible to attacks, it could produce incorrect query results to users.
In this thesis, we examined the issues of Multi-Dimensional Query results Authenti-
cation in Data Publishing. We first introduced a mechanism for users to verify that their
query answers on a multi-dimensional dataset are correct, in the sense of being com-
plete (i.e., no qualifying data points are omitted) and authentic (i.e., all the result values
originated from the owner). Our approach is to add authentication information into a
spatial data structure, by constructing certified chains on the points within each partition,
as well as on all the partitions in the data space. Given a query, we generated proof
that every data point within those intervals of the certified chains that overlap the query
window either is returned as a result value, or fails to meet some query condition. We
studied two instantiations of the approach: Verifiable KD-tree (VKDtree) that is based
on space partitioning, and Verifiable R-tree (VRtree) that is based on data partitioning.
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The schemes are evaluated on window queries, and results show that VRtree is highly
precise, meaning that few data points outside of a query result are disclosed in the course
of proving its correctness.
As an extension, we examined the authentication of kNN query results in Multi-
dimensional database, we introduce an authentication scheme for outsourced multi-dimensional
databases. With the proposed scheme, users can verify that their query answers from a
publisher are complete (i.e., no qualifying tuples are omitted) and authentic (i.e., all the
result values are legitimate). In addition, our scheme guaranteed minimality (i.e. no
non-answer points are returned in the plain). This scheme supports window, range, kNN
and RNN queries on multi-dimensional databases. We have implemented the proposed
scheme, and our experimental results on kNN queries show that our approach is a prac-
tical scheme with low overhead.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Trust-Preserving Set Operations
Trust-Preserving Set Operation Problem is proposed by Ruggero et.al.in paper [24]. In
this problem, the party performing the computation does not need to be trusted, but the
result is a set which is trusted to the same extent as the original input. The techniques
have a range of potential applications such as addressing the problem of securely reusing
content-based search results in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
Given an example model with two trusted source nodes, s1, s2, each store an index
in the form of S1, S2; an untrusted directory d; and a client c, standard set operation
(such as union, difference, and intersection) are performed with problem raised on how
to construct a scheme that allows c to verify that d didn’t falsify the result of the query.
Current solution of this problem is accomplished by requiring trusted nodes to sign
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appropriates, defined digest of generated sets, and each such digest consists of an RSA
accumulator and a Bloom filter. Two kinds of attacks might be performed: insertion
attack and deletion attack. Current solution based on counting bloom filters compares the
bloom filter, which is obtained as the element-by-element minimum of Bl(S1), Bl(S2),
with the bloom filter Bl(I 0) of the returned intersection to detect the insertion attacks.
And the scheme also requires the directory to justify each gap (an index j is called a gap
if Bl(I)j is strictly less than Blj) to make sure there is no deletion attack.
However, this solution with a simple compressed counting bloom filter would suffer
from several limitations: The attacks such as insert an outside element into the inter-
section, although it can be solved at the cost of Bloom filters with a prohibitively large
number of counters. Moreover, this simple scheme also suffers from the heavy load of
the Bloom filter.
How to derive a simple and efficient scheme with lower overhead for the this set-
operation scheme is an interesting and meaningful problem for us to investigate.
5.2.2 Authenticating Aggregation Queries in Outsourced Database
Systems
Current wok on query authentication has focused on studying the general selection and
projection queries. Another important aspect of query authentication in outsourced
database system that has not been considered yet is handling aggregation queries.
When processing an aggregation query, although intermediate data might be involved
during the computation, only result answers need to be returned. However, in a Third-
party Publisher System, it would be infeasible for the user to authenticate the returned
answer from publisher without the knowledge of the detailed data. In this case, we
address the scenario where a user has the rights to know (at least some of) the detailed
data underlying the aggregation it is given.
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The most straight forward solution is, along with the aggregation result returned,
the publisher sends all the answer-related detailed data to user. The user could first
verify the returned data with authentication techniques such as Merkle Hash Tree [15]
or Signature Chain [29] Methods, and then compute the result and verify authenticity
its own. However, with this method, a ”sum” query might require the publisher returns
all the values to the user, in this case this trivial solution is very inefficient. There are
several drawbacks:
 Communication Cost: the communication between the publisher and the user
might be expensive.
 Network Traffic: network traffic might be caused during data transmission espe-
cially when such large amount of data transferred.
 Access Control: Sometimes, the user might not be encouraged to know the detailed
data of an aggregation query.
 ComputationWorkload: The user’s workload might be too heavy when complicate
calculations required.
As stated previously, communication just the result of a query is in many cases very
efficient, but it does not give the guarantee of correctness.(example of random sampling)
Thus it is a tradeoff between the query processing efficiency and result accuracy. In term
of result authentication, we cannot do better than send all the detailed data related to
the aggregation query to the user, which might be very inefficient in practice. We may
set our goal of this problem is to reduce the communication cost between the user and
publisher as well as achieve high accuracy of aggregation result.
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